UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----X Docket#

: 20-cv-00756-ARR-PK SILVA,

Plaintiff,

: U.S. Courthouse - versus -

: Brooklyn, New York

HORNELL BREWING CO., INC., et al. : December 3, 2020 Defendants : 2:34 PM

TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR DISCOVERY CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE PEGGY M. KUO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

P P E A R A N C E S: (TELEPHONICALLY)

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound-recording, transcript produced by transcription service

1 THE COURT: Civil Cause for Discovery 2 Conference by Telephone in the matter of Christopher 3 Silva v. Hornell Brewing Company, Inc., et al, docket number 20-cv-756. Magistrate Judge Peggy Kuo presiding. 4 5 Will the parties please state their 6 appearances, starting with plaintiff? 7 MR. FRANCIS: Good afternoon, your Honor. 8 For plaintiff, this is Jeremy Francis with the 9 Sultzer Law Group, S-U-L-T-Z-E-R. 10 MR. WOLFSON: Good afternoon, your Honor. 11 This is Howard Wolfson from Morrison Cohen for 12 the defendants. 13 MS. POLLACK: Good afternoon, your Honor. 14 This is Gayle Pollack, also from Morrison Cohen for the defendants. 15 16 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, 17 everyone. I received a letter that was filed at docket 18 19 number 37 that raises discovery disputes that both sides 20 have with the other's responses. This was filed now, was 21 dated November 20th, so I will turn to each one in turn. 22 I'll start with the plaintiff's requests that there be --23 well, I guess I will call it a motion to compel 24 responses, and then I'll return to the defendants' motion 25 to compel. Given that it's been over a week since this

was filed, if there are any updates, please fill me in on that, as well.

So Mr. Francis, why don't you start? Tell me what exactly is still missing, and why you're entitled to that information or those documents.

MR. FRANCIS: Certainly. Thank you, your Honor. I think from plaintiff's perspective, the short answer is not much, if anything, has changed since the submission of the letter, probably true for defendants, as well.

Plaintiffs have not received any documents in this case, nor has there been an agreement on a date to exchange documents. I've -- as you can see from the letter, I've broken down the categories of documents and information that the plaintiffs believe -- plaintiff believes he is entitled to. I can go through those if you like, and each of the interrogatories and document requests that would correspond to those broad categories.

You know, I don't want to belabor the point as a lot of this is already set forth in the letter, but I'm happy to go through it categorically if that's what you would like.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying to figure out the best way to resolve these issues for you. So I see that you're asking for information related to document --

related to other products sold by defendants, but I don't know why that's relevant.

MR. FRANCIS: Yes.

THE COURT: So if you could just go through it and tell me.

MR. FRANCIS: Sure. Sure. Absolutely. Yes, there are a few interrogatories, as well as document requests related to other products sold by the defendant. I think during our meet and confers, plaintiff agreed to limit those requests to other products that defendant sells that are labeled as "natural" or "all natural" or any derivation thereof, as well as other what we'll call "gummy" products sold by the defendants. This is a case involving chewable gummies.

And the reason that those documents and that information is relevant is for a damages analysis in this case, specifically a price premium analysis. The best and most direct way to do a price premium analysis is to have appropriate comparable products.

So to the extent that defendant sells other gummy products, other similar gummy products that are not labeled as natural or all natural, or other products that are not gummies that are so-labeled, that is relevant -- it's directly relevant to plaintiffs being able to conduct such a price premium analysis.

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Proceedings
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              And I mean, moving forward through the letter
   that we've sent, we've also asked --
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              THE COURT: Well, okay --
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              MR. FRANCIS: -- for -- sure.
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              THE COURT: So maybe, Mr. Francis, maybe the
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   best way to handle it is you --
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              MR. FRANCIS: You want me to stop?
              THE COURT: -- (audio interference) these three
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   categories --
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              MR. FRANCIS: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: Well, these three categories relate
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   to the premium, right?
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              MR. FRANCIS: When you say "three categories"?
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              THE COURT: With the information about other
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   products -- well, I'm looking at your filling --
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              MR. FRANCIS: Sure.
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              THE COURT: -- it says documents related to
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   other products --
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              MR. FRANCIS: Right.
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              THE COURT: -- sales data for those products,
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   and then document related to how defendants determine
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   pricing. So that is --
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              MR. FRANCIS: That's right.
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              THE COURT: -- the price premium -- the
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   premium.
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- Proceedings MR. FRANCIS: That's absolutely right. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. Okay. 3 MR. FRANCIS: Each of those categories --THE COURT: So those are --4 5 MR. FRANCIS: -- relate to --6 THE COURT: -- the price premium damages. 7 MR. FRANCIS: Correct. THE COURT: So then let's talk about what 8 9 defendant has to say about those. 10 MR. FRANCIS: I'd also, just before you do so, 11 I'd also lump into that category, interrogatory number 12 11, which has to do with the identity of the retailers. 13 That is something that is necessary to us to determine 14 pricing of the products. To the extent that defendants 15 don't have the retail pricing, and again, that would be 16 relevant to doing a damages and price premium analysis. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else --18 any other -- are there any other categories that fit into 19 this premium damages' argument? 20 MR. FRANCIS: I don't believe so, your Honor, 21 no. That conversation --
- MR. FRANCIS: Okay. so why don't we take that
- 23 | first? Mr. Wolfson or Ms. Pollack?
- MR. WOLFSON: Thank you, your Honor.
- 25 First, let me just say Mr. Francis said that

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Proceedings
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   they received no documents. We haven't received any
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   documents either, so you know, neither side has produced
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   documents, and it's obvious why, because we have
   disputes. So I just don't want you to think that there's
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   been some one-way discovery here.
              THE COURT: I don't think --
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              MR. WOLFSON: (Audio interference) to the --
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              THE COURT: -- there is one-way discovery. I
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   think the problem is --
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              MR. WOLFSON: Yes.
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              THE COURT: -- that there's no discovery and
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   that in itself is a problem.
                                  So --
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              MR. WOLFSON: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: -- I wouldn't --
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              MR. WOLFSON: I understand that.
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              THE COURT: -- rest on that being a positive
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   thing, so --
              MR. WOLFSON: Yeah. So let me turn to the
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   specific issue because I think this illustrates what the
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   problem is with discovery. My client, Arizona Iced Tea,
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   makes literally hundreds of products, most of which are
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   beverage products. The iced tea, fruit drinks, Arnold
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   Palmer drinks, and other drinks you see in various
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   outlets.
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              The product at issue in this case is a, I guess
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you would call it a "fruit chew". It has nothing to do with the beverage products. I think it's the only fruit chew they make, though I am checking into that.

Just so you understand, your Honor, this is a product that has very limited distribution anywhere in the United States. So they've asked us in discovery for all of our pricing, and other proprietary, confidential, and irrelevant information about hundreds of beverage products that are not the subject of any claim in this action.

And if you look at their own complaint, their price premium damage claim is, they say that because we put all natural on the label for this fruit chew, that they paid more for the fruit chew product, than they would have paid for what they call -- this is the term in the complaint -- "comparable" fruit chew products that didn't use the term all natural.

So their damage analysis is whatever they paid -- you know, whatever Mr. Silva allegedly paid for our product, and I'll just \$1.50, and versus what he paid -- deduct what he paid for a comparable product, let's say he paid \$1.40, so their damage calculation would be ten cents per package.

You know, the damage or price premium analysis has absolutely nothing to do with what Arizona charges

for a 12 ounce can of iced tea, or a gallon container of Arnold Palmer, or an 8 ounce bottle of water, or any of those beverage products that aren't mentioned anywhere in the complaint, and have absolutely nothing to do with the claims that have been alleged. That is our position, your Honor.

THE COURT: So -- all right. So what I am hearing is if you're looking for information as to the premium that was paid, that a consumer would pay for a product, this fruit chew product, above what a non-all natural fruit chew product would be, the way to get that is not by comparison to pricing information related to iced tea product.

MR. WOLFSON: That's correct, your Honor, and as I said, we're talking about literally hundreds of different iced tea fruit drinks and other products, in all different sizes from a gallon down to 6 ounces.

THE COURT: Uh-hum.

MR. WOLFSON: The plaintiff's theory is I could've bought -- and I'll just pick a name -- I could've bought Welch's Fruit Chews that don't say all natural for \$1.40, but instead, I bought your product for \$1.50, and so the price premium was a dime. That's the damages.

Now, I will also tell you although I don't want

to jump too far ahead, we've asked them in discovery, what is the comparable product that you allege in the complaint you could have bought for less? And they've not provided any answer for that, but they don't need pricing about our gallon iced teas. Their damage claim is based upon what Mr. Silva claims he paid for this, for our product which he still hasn't told us, and --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLFSON: -- what he claims, he's either paid in the past, or could have paid at that time for a comparable product that wasn't labeled all natural.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. WOLFSON: Our other products --

THE COURT: So Mr. Francis --

MR. WOLFSON: -- could not be more utterly irrelevant to this.

THE COURT: I hear you on that. You've said that already. So Mr. Francis, why does the product pricing for other products have anything to do with the difference between what your client would've paid for an all natural fruit chew, as opposed to a not all natural fruit chew?

MR. FRANCIS: Well, I think we're talking about two separate categories here. First of all, you know, we've already stated that we've limited this request at

this point through the meet and confer to other products
that are either other gummy fruit chew products that
Arizona produces, which they may not, as defendant
asserted there, in which case there would be nothing to
get there, as well as other products they produce that
have some iteration of the term natural.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FRANCIS: So --

THE COURT: So that's the question. That is exactly the question, Mr. Francis.

MR. FRANCIS: Right, understood.

THE COURT: Other products being primarily drinks, so why does whether a natural fruit drink, how that is priced, why does that matter?

MR. FRANCIS: The answer to that is because while the most direct and relevant comparison at issue here would be between a fruit chew labeled as natural, and a fruit chew not labeled as natural.

There is also a sort of cross-check of sorts that can be done between an Arizona product, say -- call it an iced tea product that is labeled as natural, and one that is labeled not all natural.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FRANCIS: The pricing of those products if

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Proceedings THE COURT: I got it. 1 2 MR. FRANCIS: If Arizona is pricing an all 3 natural iced tea ten cents higher than it prices a nonall natural iced tea, that is an indication that they 4 5 consider the natural representation to be valuable to the 6 consumer, which is directly relevant to this case. 7 THE COURT: Why does it matter what they think 8 is important? Isn't it a question of what your client suffered because it's a damages. 10 MR. FRANCIS: It's an ultimate --11 THE COURT: So if your --12 MR. FRANCIS: That's right. I mean --13 THE COURT: -- client is saying, okay -- if 14 your client says if I had known that this was not all 15 natural, I would not have paid the extra 10 cents or a 16 dollar, all right? 17 So the comparison there is between an all 18 natural product, and a non-all natural product, the same 19 thing, you can't -- unless he's saying, which is not what 20 he is saying, if I had known that there was some 21 difference, I wouldn't have bought a fruit chew, I would

MR. FRANCIS: Right.

have gotten an iced tea, right?

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THE COURT: So that's not what he is saying.

25 | So then these really are not relevant here at all.

MR. FRANCIS: Well, I'm moving a little bit beyond damages calculation here.

THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. FRANCIS: The idea that they're going to try to raise is a defense that they do not charge a premium at all based on the word all natural, or that consumers don't care, or simply won't pay more for products that are all natural --

THE COURT: But that's information --

MR. FRANCIS: -- and their price --

THE COURT: -- that you can get on your -yeah, that has nothing to do with what this company is
doing because I am sure that your argument is going to be
the market itself prices differently, and you will bring
in other examples. So whether there's -- and I mean, if
you have -- if this company makes a fruit chew or
comparable product that is not all natural, or not
labeled as such, you could get pricing for that, and then
if you found that that was priced lower, then you might
be able to say that it's different.

So that would be permissible, but not any other product that's labeled all natural or not all natural because you still don't have a -- you don't have a price comparison because if all you're asking for is the pricing information for everything labeled all natural,

you still don't have the pricing information for the products that are not all natural in order to do that price comparison. So it doesn't make sense to me --

MR. FRANCIS: Under --

THE COURT: -- that you're seeking this.

MR. FRANCIS: No, understood. We have perhaps given up too much in agreeing to limit ourselves to all natural.

THE COURT: Right, yeah. But it --

MR. FRANCIS: So that has --

THE COURT: Yeah. So by doing that, what you've done is indicated to me that the information you're seeking is not what you have now claimed, and so I don't think it's relevant here. So that request to compel is denied.

So let's move onto your next category. Why don't you tell me what that has to -- how the relevance argument plays out there.

MR. FRANCIS: Sure. So I mean, I don't know if we have -- if we've covered interrogatory number 11, which is the identity of the retailers, again this --

THE COURT: Yes, I don't find that relevant.

MR. FRANCIS: Okay.

THE COURT: If there's a specific need for your contacting those retailers for something that's relevant,

- maybe but at this point, you haven't laid out a basis.

 All you've said is if the plaintiff don't have pricing

 data for the product, it says here, pricing information

 for the product, then you would try to get that from the

 retailers, but I haven't seen or heard that the

 defendants don't have pricing information for the

 product.
 - MR. FRANCIS: Understood. So the next category, a broad category, is the ingredients in the products. We've asked for descriptions of the manufacturing process of the ingredients, identities of the manufacturers, descriptions of the -- documents sufficient to identify the formulation in the product, and changes in those formulations over time, and this is sort of repetitive of the interrogatory, but documents sufficient to identify manufacturers as well.

THE COURT: And why do you want this information?

MR. FRANCIS: So again, this information, and I believe we discussed this a little bit during the meet and confer, but how these ingredients are processed, whether or not these ingredients would be considered synthetic to a reasonable consumer, which is at the heart of this case. For some of these ingredients, at the very least, will often depend on the manufacturing process.

There are ingredients that can be derived naturally, which a consumer may or may not consider synthetic, and then there are ingredients that the same ingredient can be industrially produced in a manner that we would argue renders it synthetic in the eyes of a reasonable consumer.

So the manufacturing process is important in the ultimate question of the case, whether these ingredients are synthetic. In order to determine how the -- these are all questions designed to determine how exactly these ingredients are processed -- are produced.

As far as the changes in the formulation, what we're really looking for here are reasons for the changes in these formulations. One can envision, not that this happens often, but can envision an email or a memorandum asking for a change to an ingredient, or the change in the way an ingredient is produced to make it more or less natural in ways -- you know, for example, if they decided to change their labeling to all natural, they could send an email to the manufacturer saying we want to produce it in this way now, and that would be directly relevant to whether that ingredient is in fact natural or synthetic.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wolfson?

MR. WOLFSON: What counsel just informed you or described, is not what's alleged in the complaint. The

complaint alleges that Mr. Silva on an unspecified date purchased this product, and has the label that they claim, and the ingredients are listed, and there are six ingredients that they allege in the complaint, are in the product, and that are allegedly synthetic and not natural.

Whether the product had a different formulation earlier when Mr. Silva didn't buy it, and whether it had a different formulation later when Mr. Silva didn't buy it, is just -- again, it's just irrelevant. He says, "When I purchased the product, these are the ingredients and they allegedly are synthetic."

So the changes, if any, before, or the changes if any, after, are irrelevant.

Second, there are six different ingredients that they say are allegedly synthetic, and what I don't understand is are they now saying that there's a specific one of those ingredients, or more than one, that depending upon how it was manufactured, may actually be all natural and not synthetic? And they may have made a mistake when they alleged in the complaint that all of those ingredients were synthetic.

Again, this is not the facts or the theory that's alleged in the complaint. This sounds like it's an attempt to rewrite the complaint because they realized

that some of these ingredients must in fact not be synthetic.

So again, it is not relevant to the claims that they've asserted in the complaint -- and I should say the amended complaint. You know, they had an opportunity to amend, and this is just not the claims that are alleged.

THE COURT: So Mr. Francis, I'm looking at the amended complaint, and the list of what you call synthetic ingredients, and it seems to me your theory in that amended complaint is that these ingredients are in fact, not natural but synthetic, and so if you're alleging that they are in fact synthetic, how they were produced might be relevant to your argument about them being synthetic rather than natural, but whether the formulation changed over time, so that there was more gelatin, for example, and less citric acid doesn't seem to go to the issue that you've alleged.

And then, whether the -- who the manufacturers were wouldn't matter either because I think Mr. Wilson raises a good point, either you're saying that for some manufacturers and their processes, these may be natural, but for some, they would be synthetic. If that's the case, that actually hurts your case, and I'm not really sure why you're alleging that because on its face, the complaint says gelatin is synthetic. You're not saying

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   there's a naturally occurring version of gelatin which I
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   assume might be what defense is saying, but you're not
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   saying that, so I am not really sure why you're trying to
   aet --
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              MR. FRANCIS: Well, that's --
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              THE COURT: -- this information, unless you're
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   trying to defend against that defense, I don't know.
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              MR. FRANCIS: That's --
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              THE COURT: But the defense has been brought
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   up --
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              MR. FRANCIS:
                            That's right.
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
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              MR. FRANCIS: That's right, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. So --
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              MR. FRANCIS: It would be relevant to a defense
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    that the ingredients are, in fact, natural, right --
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. FRANCIS: -- which we --
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              THE COURT: So let me ask --
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              MR. FRANCIS: -- anticipate will happen here.
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              THE COURT: -- Mr. Wolfson. Yeah, let me ask
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   Mr. Wolfson if you are saying that, so is one of the
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   defenses that these ingredients are natural, and that
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   that might -- there would be a difference between a
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   synthetic and a natural ingredient based on how it's
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produced?

MR. WOLFSON: Well --

THE COURT: Because just based on my laymen's understanding of ingredients, there may be -- gelatin may well be naturally occurring, but if you isolate it and put it into like a powdered form that you put in Jell-O, then it may be not natural but I don't know. Maybe it still is natural even though it's in powder form, rather than, you know, a naturally occurring process where you cook bones, and then when you put it in the refrigerator it gels. So I'm not really sure what the situation is here from the defendant's perspective.

MR. WOLFSON: Well, your Honor, I guess first because none of this is alleged in the complaint, including that these ingredients may be natural depending upon how their manufactured, this is not something that has been at issue yet or that frankly, I've taken a deep dive on.

I will tell you, because you ask our position, our position is that every one of the ingredients and the product as a whole is -- that calling it or labeling it all natural is not misleading.

THE COURT: Uh-hum.

MR. WOLFSON: Okay. It's not a specific ingredient by ingredient defense that we have. Our

position is that there's nothing misleading about calling this product all natural, and so I don't think that the manufacturing process, which again, none of it -- this is is alleged in the complaint. There's nothing that would've ever put us on notice until this moment that their claim now depends not on what the ingredients are, but how the ingredients -- not the product, each separate ingredient, how each separate ingredient was manufactured, and so --

THE COURT: And what I hear Mr. Francis saying is that it's -- they're trying to pre-empt your defense, and so they read into your answer, a defense that these products are all natural, and that that could be based on the manufacturing process, and so they're anticipating perhaps how you're trying to prove your defense, that they're natural, by showing that --

MR. WOLFSON: Well, I --

THE COURT: -- because of the process, they're not natural anymore.

MR. WOLFSON: Yeah, I hear that too, your Honor. I can only tell you that hasn't been alleged yet in the case, it hasn't been an issue yet in the case. We haven't gotten to expert discovery involving the ingredients, and how any of them are made or manufactured, and so I can't today tell you whether when

we get to those issues, any of these six ingredients, whether they're natural, or not natural, will be the -- based upon the manufacturing process. It seems to me if that does become relevant at some point, that we can revisit this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. So then what might make sense is if this becomes the subject of further exploration, perhaps through interrogatories or other means, to find out if in fact that is a defense, and if it turns out that is a defense, then there might be a basis for requesting this particular information.

So Mr. Francis, you may have jumped a few steps ahead of yourself. You may still be able to catch up, or have everybody else catch up to you, but it may be too soon to ask for this information if that defense, in fact, is not being offered. All right?

MR. FRANCIS: Under --

THE COURT: And the answer doesn't give me enough information to show that that is in fact a defense, so you would need to explore it a little bit further and get more details on that.

MR. FRANCIS: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So then the last piece of your request was --

MR. FRANCIS: I think there are two --

THE COURT: -- (audio interference). 1 2 MR. FRANCIS: -- yeah, two more --3 THE COURT: Product (indiscernible)? MR. FRANCIS: What's that? 4 5 THE COURT: I'm reading the last, you said 6 finally, defendant objects to interrogatory 12. 7 MR. FRANCIS: We may have jumped over, and let 8 me see the letter here, interrogatories 1, and 2, which may -- yes, interrogatories 1 and 2, which are 9 defendants' definition of natural, as well as defendants' 10 11 understanding as to what a reasonable consumer believes 12 the term all natural means, and defendants have declined 13 to answer those interrogatories, I believe on the basis 14 that, you know, it doesn't matter what Arizona thinks, 15 and it doesn't matter what they think a reasonable consumer thinks. Ultimately, what a reasonable consumer 16 thinks is the issue at trial. 17 Our position is what Arizona believes a 18 19 reasonable consumer thinks the term all natural means, 20 and how they define it themselves is directly relevant to how a reasonable consumer thinks of the term all natural. 21 22 We plan -- we anticipate doing consumer surveys and 23 presenting expert evidence with regards to how consumers 24 interpret all natural, but certainly the company's own 25 definition and understanding of that is relevant, as

1 well.

bear on the issue that we just talked about which is if the defendant believes all natural can include certain product -- certain ingredients, depending on their manufacturing process, that might be an answer, or if it's all natural because the ingredients are listed in let's say FDA list of things that could be called all natural, then that might be enough, so I think the first part of the question might make sense, what the definition is by the defendant itself.

The second one about what a reasonable consumer thinks doesn't seem to be relevant because they are not the arbiter of a reasonable consumer.

Mr. Wolfson, do you want to add anything to that?

MR. WOLFSON: Yes, your Honor, thank you.

The first interrogatory says what is your definition of the term all natural used on the label.

Now they've noticed depositions of three of our employees including the chairman of the company, and you know, that is certainly an appropriate question for them to ask the witness at a deposition, although I might take the position if we ever have a trial, that's irrelevant, but certainly, you know, you can ask a witness.

But to propound an interrogatory for us to give some all-inclusive or uniform definition that would be binding on every witness, I don't think that's a proper use of an interrogatory. They've asked for the witnesses who made the decision to use the all natural on the label, and we're giving them those witnesses, and they can ask that question at deposition.

THE COURT: Well, but for purposes of getting information about the defendant, and here the defendant is a corporation, so they're -- and the corporation made a decision to put the label all natural on that product, so I think it's a fair question even if there are individuals who can answer the question, to find out the official corporation position policy basis for using that term on this product.

You're right, it is a proper topic for a deposition but it doesn't make it an improper topic for interrogatory to get a clear definition, or a simple definition that is what the corporation was thinking when this decision was made, and it will also assist in the further discovery that we just talked about which is if there is a definition that -- I can just, off the top of my head, think of different ways this could go, right? The answer could be we rely on a list of products or ingredients that we're permitted to call all natural,

because the government has told us to, a regulator has said it's proper, or you can say we do investigations into this, and these other criteria were used and among the criteria could be manufacturing processes or maybe not.

So you may rely on some in-house experts or outside experts who tell you, that's fine, you can call that natural because it's naturally occurring.

So you know, to get that information in advance, I think will assist in the deposition because it will enable there to be further document discovery if necessary, so by the time everybody gets the deposition it's pretty clear what is going on, and what further questions and clarifications may be necessary.

So that first question about the defendants' definition of all natural seems quite proper.

MR. WOLFSON: Can I just briefly just address that --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. WOLFSON: -- and I certainly hear your Honor. If what on earth the phrase all natural or natural meant, you know, was clear, we wouldn't have any of these litigations. Unfortunately, the FDA's so far refused to clarify them. If you go online, and you Google what is an all natural product, you'll find

1 articles saying, you know, nobody really knows what the 2 heck it means.

THE COURT: It --

MR. WOLFSON: This interrogatory question,
"What is your definition of the term all natural" presupposes that the company has a company uniform
definition of the term all natural and that it's because
of that definition that the phrase all natural is on the
product, and what I am saying to you, your Honor, is that
my -- I believe my three witnesses will give different
answers to that question and they're answers that are
based on their personal view of what that term means, and
it may have absolutely nothing to do with why that phrase
is on the product.

THE COURT: Right. So then if I could try to resolve this issue by rephrasing the interrogatory to say what is the basis on which the defendant put this phrase on this product.

MR. WOLFSON: Or your Honor, if it says does your company have a definition of the term all natural used on the label --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. WOLFSON: -- and if so, what is it?

THE COURT: Well, yes, but you told me there

25 | isn't one and so what I am trying to get at is --

MR. WOLFSON: No. 1 2 THE COURT: -- why is it --3 MR. WOLFSON: No, your --THE COURT: -- obviously, it's undisputed that 4 5 this label says all natural, so somebody had to decide to 6 put it there, and so the question can simply be limited 7 to how the heck did this phrase get on the label? 8 says all natural, I'm looking at it right now, and so someone put it there, and whoever put it there, if it's a 9 10 vice president of fruit snacks or whatever it is, or some 11 other person who said great, we can do that, had to have 12 a basis for it, and so that's the person -- that's the 13 person who should be asked, how did this label get on 14 there. 15 Now if it turns out, again, I am just making 16 things up as a hypothetical that no one made that 17 decision, that a marketing person said that would sound 18 really nice, let's put it there, then that's important to 19 know too but I think --20 MR. WOLFSON: Well, but I want to make really 21 clear --22 THE COURT: -- how it got there --23 MR. WOLFSON: No, no, and I understand that. 24 THE COURT: -- is an important question, right? 25 MR. WOLFSON: No, I don't have a problem with

that. I'm just saying I don't want you to misunderstand anything I'm saying. What I am saying is two people may have discussed putting that phrase on the label, and each of those people or persons, may have a different understanding about what all natural means, and I'm simply suggesting that neither one of their definitions of what that phrase they personally believe means, may explain why it's on the box.

THE COURT: But somebody authorized it. It's there. So if those people --

MR. WOLFSON: I don't -- I can't --

THE COURT: -- disagree --

MR. WOLFSON: -- (audio interference) dispute that, Judge, yeah.

THE COURT: Yeah, so if those two people disagree, that highlights to me why this is an important question to pose not to those two individuals in a deposition but in an interrogatory where your client can explore the question how did this word get on there when people disagree about it, and then you can have someone say I'm the one, or someone can answer it, that the decision was made because on the whole, this was the reason, the analysis, even if there's disagreement.

So it doesn't have to be that everybody in the company agrees, that's the whole point, but someone made

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   the decision notwithstanding any disagreement, that this
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   is the -- these are the words that would be on this
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   product, so that's why it's an important and relevant
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    topic for an interrogatory, so that the company can
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    say --
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              MR. WOLFSON: That's a --
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              THE COURT: -- someone put it there, and this
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   is the reason why.
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              MR. WOLFSON: Judge, I am not quarreling with
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   anything you said.
              THE COURT: Um-hum.
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              MR. WOLFSON: I'm simply responding to why this
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   interrogatory, as it was propounded, we thought was --
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
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              MR. WOLFSON: -- an objectionable
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   interrogatory.
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              THE COURT: Yes, yes. And I understand why it
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   may be a difficult interrogatory to answer but I think
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   it's relevant, so you should answer it.
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              MR. WOLFSON: That's also, Judge, why I just
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   suggested, if we're having these people at depositions
   and we've agreed to produce them --
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              THE COURT: So I know --
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              MR. WOLFSON: -- why they can't be (audio
25
   interference) --
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1 THE COURT: -- Mr. Wolfson, but what you've 2 already told me is that these people may disagree. 3 when there's a disagreement, it still will not answer the question as to why this product was labeled all natural. 4 5 MR. WOLFSON: Judge --6 THE COURT: You need to have an answer for 7 that. 8 MR. WOLFSON: -- they may --9 THE COURT: Somebody made the decision. You need to --10 11 MR. WOLFSON: Judge, (audio interference) --12 THE COURT: -- to have an answer. 13 MR. WOLFSON: I will say this Judge --14 THE COURT: I don't mean you, Mr. Wolfson, I 15 mean your client. 16 MR. WOLFSON: Yeah, I mean, I don't know what 17 each will say. I sure hope they don't disagree with each 18 other. 19 THE COURT: Well, then that's just the nature 20 of representing a corporation. You'll get it --21 MR. WOLFSON: And (audio interference) --22 THE COURT: -- figured out, and figure out what 23 the proper answer is. 24 Yeah, I just thought this --MR. WOLFSON:

again, we're talking with this particular interrogatory,

- 1 | why we objected, and I thought --
- THE COURT: I know, I --
- 3 MR. WOLFSON: -- our objection was well-
- 4 | founded, yeah.

- THE COURT: I understand that you had a valid objection and I have weighed the need and relevance of the interrogatory, and -- as well as your objection and on a whole, I think you should answer it because I think it's relevant, and important.
- MR. WOLFSON: Judge, should we answer it in this -- as it's right here then.
 - THE COURT: The -- no, I think it should be phrased in the more narrow way of how was all natural defined was defined as it pertains to this product, not a company-wide definition because it may be that there is a disagreement across product lines as far as all natural but all we're talking about is this product.
- 18 MR. WOLFSON: Okay, Judge, (audio 19 interference) --
 - THE COURT: If it turns out in -- again, in the exploration of this issue, if it turns out that there's relevant information that causes other products to become relevant, you can revisit -- plaintiff can revisit it but based on what I've heard now, the only relevant product is this product.

Proceedings MR. WOLFSON: We understand your Honor --1 2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Francis, do you 3 understand --MR. WOLFSON: -- thank you. 4 5 THE COURT: -- that --6 MR. WOLFSON: Yes. 7 THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Francis, I have 8 rephrased your interrogatory and directed to --9 MR. FRANCIS: Understood. 10 THE COURT: -- answer just that question. 11 MR. FRANCIS: Understood, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. I believe that the last 13 interrogatory at issue is interrogatory 12 where we asked 14 for information in defendants' possession regarding the 15 identity of their consumers -- of this particular 16 product. 17 I will -- I think the important thing here is 18 not necessarily for them to provide that information, 19 although that is what the request asks for. I think it's 20 more important to disclose whether or not they have that 21 information and that is important to class certification 22 and specifically to ascertainability. 23 Again, we're anticipating a potential defense

Again, we're anticipating a potential defense wherein they tried to argue that the class is not ascertainable because they do not sell directly to the

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consumer, they sell to retailers, and they don't have access to the retailer records regarding to whom these products were sold.

So that's really the information that we're trying to get is do they have information and what information do they have regarding the end purchasers of this product.

THE COURT: And Mr. Wolfson, what's the objection, that it's not relevant, or you don't possess it?

MR. WOLFSON: Judge, what they're asking about is Arizona has a website on which you can go -- a consumer can go and buy certain products and they've asked us to give them the names, address, telephone numbers, and other contact information for anyone who went on that website and purchased the product. And we've objected to it because we think it's irrelevant if at some time, we get to class certification, and they say they need this information in order to give notice to the class members, or if at that point, we say you can't ascertain the class because we don't know who bought it from us, all right, then I would understand its relevance but they're asking us now to give them, you know, confidential information that people might give us if they purchase this product online; their name, their

1 | address, their telephone, their confidential information.

And what's the purpose at this point? At this point, we're not at class certification, and when we get there if, in fact, it becomes relevant again, we can determine if we've got that information, and they get a class certified, I assume we'll be ordered to give them that information. I think it's not relevant at this point though.

THE COURT: So can you read to me what exactly interrogatory 12 says?

MR. WOLFSON: It says, "List the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other contact information of all consumers that purchased the product during the applicable time period."

THE COURT: Okay. So what I heard -- Mr.

Francis asks for or the relevance argument that Mr.

Francis was making, was asked to the ascertainability, so it seems to me the only question to be asked at this point is does the defendant have access to the information of who purchased the product and if it's limited to the website, you can say yes, limited to the website. If you have other consumer information somehow, you can identify the sources, and then as you said, Mr. Wilson, not provide the details until later, but being able to identify the sources would be enough for the

plaintiff to make an ascertainability argument for class certification purposes, okay?

So it seems to me asking for whether the defendant has the sources, and what types of lists they may have access to would be enough to provide to a court, as far as whether the class is ascertainable, if a class is certified, then as Mr. Wolfson stated, then the details can be turned over.

But at this point, all you will need to know is what are the potential sources, you've talked about the website, if there are others that might be a fruitful exercise to list where those things are, if they were rebate programs or other promotional things where you have access, that might be the way to go. All right?

MR. WOLFSON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that clear, Mr. Francis?

MR. FRANCIS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Wolfson, please provide that. All right.

MR. WOLFSON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So I think that takes care of all the deficiencies that plaintiff has ascertained. Now let's turn to defendants. So Mr. Wolfson, you've said that you have not gotten anything rom the plaintiff that you asked for?

MR. WOLFSON: No, your Honor. We haven't received anything, and I want to say that that includes the most basic requests that they obviously knew we would make, which is there's this very vague allegation that the plaintiff purchased this product during some month, and then in an interrogatory answer, they told us he purchased it on Amazon.

We've asked for the date, what he purchased,

We've asked for the date, what he purchased, what he paid, and most importantly, the receipt or other proof that he actually made a purchase of this product.

THE COURT: All right. So let me just ask

MR. WOLFSON: And all we've received -- I'm sorry. Go ahead, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. Let me just find out from Mr. Francis, when did your client purchase this product and was it online or was it in person?

MR. FRANCIS: It was online, as alleged in the complaint. I believe we provided the month of October 2000- -- I don't know --

THE COURT: Right, but --

MR. FRANCIS: -- but it was 2019.

THE COURT: Let me look at the complaint.

MR. FRANCIS: Sure, yeah, tell me when --

THE COURT: You said online, was it through

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   Amazon?
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              MR. FRANCIS: Yes, and that's --
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              THE COURT: Okay. Amazon has very good
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   records.
             Why can't you go through -- why can't your
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   client go back and get his order?
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              MR. FRANCIS: He has been doing so, your Honor,
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   and to the extent that he can --
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              THE COURT: It's very simple.
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              MR. FRANCIS: I understand.
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              THE COURT: It's very simple.
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              MR. FRANCIS:
                            We --
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              THE COURT: That's the beauty of Amazon.
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              MR. FRANCIS: We have not objected to producing
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   those documents --
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              THE COURT: No, but you need to produce them.
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              MR. FRANCIS: -- if he was able to locate them.
              THE COURT: Why can't he (audio interference)?
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              MR. FRANCIS: I understand but -- because -- I
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   don't know why he wouldn't be able to locate them.
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   can't honestly --
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              THE COURT: Well --
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              MR. FRANCIS: -- answer that question.
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              THE COURT: Yeah, so please --
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              MR. FRANCIS: But we tried to agree --
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              THE COURT: I (audio interference) I am a
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consumer that on Amazon, it is extremely simple, so there
should be no reason in the world. You can't even erase

it. It's there. Right?

MR. FRANCIS: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: So you need to (audio

interference) --

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MR. FRANCIS: And --

THE COURT: -- make this immediately.

MR. FRANCIS: We've not objected to producing

10 that. We had --

11 THE COURT: Well, why hasn't --

MR. FRANCIS: There are, in fact, several

13 categories here -- because we've tried to --

THE COURT: Why hasn't it been produced?

MR. FRANCIS: Because we've tried to agree on a date for mutual production with the defendants with regard to these documents, and you know, there are also documents, they're noted in the letter, several

categories of documents that they have agreed to produce

20 that we've not seen at this point.

THE COURT: But you can't -- no, no, no, no, no, no. You cannot hold up your production as a bargaining chip for the other side's production. You filed your amended complaint May 19th. We are now in December. Not to turn over basic information like when the product was

purchased, and through what means, and how much he paid for it, is so basic, that should have been turned over in the initial disclosures. So you need to turn that over immediately.

All right. Mr. Wolfson --

MR. FRANCIS: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- what else?

MR. WOLFSON: Well, your Honor, just -- I'm going to follow our letter because I listed the interrogatories and document requests by number, that addresses number 2 and number 11, which where we asked for the price, the date of purchase.

We also asked in number 2 for the plaintiff's computation of his alleged damages which again, we're not asking for the classes damages, we're asking Mr. Silva says I've paid X for this product but I could have bought an unspecified comparable product that didn't say all natural (indiscernible).

So we've asked him what product are you referring to? Tell us so we see what your damage theory is. It may turn out that this so-called comparable product costs more.

THE COURT: So can I just take a step back from this? What I heard Mr. Francis say earlier was that they are not actually objecting to turning over this

information or answering the interrogatory. They're trying to figure out a time to do that.

MR. WOLFSON: That's the --

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THE COURT: Is that (audio interference), Mr. Francis? And if that's the case, let's just figure out a time and then you'll turn over all the information, right?

MR. FRANCIS: Well, that's with regard to the -- any receipt, computer records of the purchase which would obviously include information about the date of the purchase, the price of the purchase. I think what defense counsel is asking about now is that the complaint alleges that the damage is a price premium, that he paid -- that the plaintiff paid more for this product than he otherwise would have, had the all natural representation not been on the label, and they've asked in a couple of interrogatories and document requests for information specifically about well, what is the price premium, how much more did he pay, and what product would he have otherwise purchased? What is a comparable product? And our response to that is that that's a misunderstanding of the damages theory here. It's not about any specific comparable product. It is about a hypothetical Arizona gummy chews product that did not have the labeling of all natural on it.

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Proceedings
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              THE COURT: Right. And how much would he have
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   paid for --
              MR. FRANCIS: So I think that's where we're at
 3
    a disconnect here.
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              THE COURT: How much would he have paid for
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   that hypothetical product?
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              MR. FRANCIS: I don't think that's a question
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   that he can calculate at this point.
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              THE COURT: But then how do you calculate
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   damages?
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              MR. FRANCIS: We calculate damages based on a
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   class-wide basis. You can do it through --
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              THE COURT: Well --
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              MR. FRANCIS: -- survey --
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              THE COURT: -- but you do it --
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              MR. FRANCIS: -- a content analysis --
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              THE COURT: -- hold on. Wait, hold on a
18
   second.
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              MR. FRANCIS: Sure.
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              THE COURT: The class-wide basis would be to --
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   you would take one person and then you could extrapolate
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   but if the one person can't even put a number on it, he's
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   sort of consumer number one, or consumer zero, let's say,
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   for your survey. So why can't he answer that question?
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              MR. FRANCIS: I mean, he could probably answer
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1 | that question with a range.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, then answer the question with a range.

MR. FRANCIS: That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on.

MR. WOLFSON: We --

THE COURT: We're running out of time. I've got another conference coming up, so can you please try to group your arguments, so we can get through as much as possible (audio interference).

MR. WOLFSON: Yes, your Honor. Let me just ask quickly to that one issue. Again, the complaint alleges that there are comparable products that cost less that he could've purchased. If counsel is now saying that that was just a hypothetical, that that was just a hypothetical, then I don't know how you file a complaint that says that I purchased a product and paid more because it said all natural when the plaintiff at the time he filed, didn't even know what the price was of this alleged comparable product. So --

THE COURT: All right.

22 MR. WOLFSON: -- this is one that (audio 23 interference) --

24 THE COURT: Mr. Wolfson, you can ask the 25 question. I'm sure you can ask the question or rephrase

1 the question in a way that gets you that answer, all
2 right?

MR. WOLFSON: Okay.

THE COURT: So if the question is is there a comparable product, and if Mr. Francis answers consistently with what he said today, no, then you can follow-up with what is the range, which I think Mr. -- a price that he would've paid and Mr. Francis has said he can answer that question.

So please parse it out if you want to rephrase the question so that it addresses what you now understand Mr. Francis to be saying.

MR. WOLFSON: Okay. Judge, we've also asked for his employment history. I think it's relevant what his prior employment and experience is to his adequacy as a class representative, as well as to his -- whether he was really misled because we understand that some of his prior employment, he may have actually worked in the industry as a creative designer on products that were labeled by clients he worked for as natural.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WOLFSON: He's refused to --

THE COURT: So --

MR. WOLFSON: -- disclose his --

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to interrupt you. So

what I hear you saying is that the issue of his prior employment is important to figure out if he -- his level of sophistication in terms of understanding the product label all natural, is that right?

MR. WOLFSON: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLFSON: Correct.

THE COURT: So why is that not relevant, Mr.

Francis?

MR. FRANCIS: Well, it is relevant except that they've asked for his entire employment history. They've also subpoenaed his current employer, and the danger here is that they're going -- they're essentially going to use this to subpoena and harass his former employers, when what they should be doing is simply asking in interrogatory, narrowly-tailored interrogatory, as to whether he has done work on campaigns that feature the terms natural or all natural. And that answers their question and is directly relevant to what they're trying to get at.

THE COURT: Okay. So you should turn over your client's employment history, and if there's any harassing action, you can bring it to the Court's attention, and tell me why it's harassing, all right? Let's move on.

MR. WOLFSON: Your Honor, the next issue and

this is really the central issue for us in this case, is Mr. Silva previous brought another purported class action against Smucker's, claiming he was misled there to purchase a product because he didn't understand what natural meant, and this was several years ago.

He was represented in that case by Joseph Lipari, who is his counsel in this case. Mr. Lipari is his brother-in-law. Mr. Lipari also represents Mr. Silva's girlfriend in yet another consumer class action.

We believe, and Judge Ross just sustained our affirmative defense which is the letter I sent to you, we believe that at the time that Mr. Silva purchased this product, he purchased it for the purpose of asserting this lawsuit and not because he was misled. And we've asked for the communications that he had prior to this lawsuit being filed with Mr. Silva and other third parties about whether to go and purchase this product.

We can (audio interference) --

THE COURT: Wait, I'm sorry. Communications
between? I'm sorry, you said between Mr. Silva and whom?
MR. WOLFSON: And Mr. Lipari, as well as -THE COURT: Lipari.

MR. WOLFSON: -- any other third parties, for example, he might've had a communication with his -- Mr. Silva might have had a communication with his wife, who

is Mr. Lipari's sister, where it was discussed that he should go and purchase this product online, so that they could file this lawsuit.

THE COURT: All right. So the request for document -- tell me the number?

MR. WOLFSON: It's --

THE COURT: 13.

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MR. WOLFSON: -- number 3, number 3, number 13, and number 36, the document requests.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLFSON: And 37 --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WOLFSON: -- which is whether he had any similar conversations or communications with any other law firm.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. So Mr. Francis?

MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, I think ultimately,

18 we can answer those questions because the answer is going

19 | -- is simply going to be none. So I think --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FRANCIS: And I think that that's something that we -- there are several of these document requests that are raised in the letter that were the subject of meet and confers prior to this, that I believed we had already agreed to supplement our responses to indicate

1 that no such documents existed, and that would include
2 these requests.

THE COURT: Okay. So then let me -- I heard the parties in the next conference -- the 3:30 conference join the line, so please be patient as I finish up this conference.

So in the interest of trying to be efficient here, Mr. Francis, are there interrogatories remaining to which you are not supplementing, to which you maintain your objection, so that we can discuss what your objections are?

MR. WOLFSON: As to --

MR. FRANCIS: I don't --

MR. WOLFSON: -- (audio interference) document

15 request two --

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MR. FRANCIS: Go ahead.

MR. WOLFSON: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to --

18 but document request two, because there's only three

19 interrogatories that were at issue, there were more

20 document requests.

THE COURT: Okay. I didn't mean to limit it to interrogatories, but I meant all the requests.

MR. WOLFSON: Okay. I'm sorry, your Honor.

MR. FRANCIS: No, your Honor, I don't actually

25 | believe there are.

THE COURT: So you'll be supplementing all the remaining document requests?

MR. FRANCIS: I believe that's correct, including -- I think they have asked for -- I want to cabin that a little bit. There are requests they have made that would include -- for example, they have made requests regarding documents related to the prior action in which our firm represented Mr. Silva.

We will produce those documents that are in Mr. Silva's possession, to the extent that they're not privileged communications, and I think that goes for the -- some of the other communications that we've agreed to produce as well.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FRANCIS: I understand that the defense counsel is asking for things prior to the engagement as counsel, and that's fine, but after he was -- after we were retained, I think, we're going to object to those on privilege grounds.

THE COURT: So Mr. Francis --

MR. WOLFSON: Right, but let me just --

THE COURT: -- for every -- wait, hold on. So Mr. Francis, if you're saying that there are privileged documents, you need to create a privilege log, all right? And if there are other objections that you're interposing

1 -- actually, so you need a privilege log number one.
2 Number two, it's not just possession, it's possession,
3 custody or control --

MR. FRANCIS: Yes.

not an actual product.

THE COURT: -- of anything that is still within the control of your client is subject to this request.

Mr. Wolfson, you started to say something?

MR. WOLFSON: Yes, your Honor. There's just one -- there's one distinction that's very important. We've asked for materials that he received in the Smucker's action after he started the action because these materials will show, we believe, the education that he received in that action, about what is, and what is

And so the materials that he received, whether they were articles, pleadings, potential expert materials, but all discussions that he was having about what is or isn't a natural product goes to the heart again of this defense that this is not a consumer that could have been misled to buy this product. This is a -- as Judge Ross said, a unique set of facts where someone who says, you know -- it's like the old saying, fool me once, you know, good for you. We don't think he could've been fooled, that he received an education but I need the documents that he received that show the education,

1 otherwise what I can cross-examine him with?

THE COURT: Yes, and so I hear the -- Mr.

Francis say that he will go through the materials, and I have told him that if he's withholding anything based on privilege, he needs to make a privilege log, so we know exactly what's being withheld, and then we can go -- if there's a dispute on that, we can go through each of the items to see whether they are, in fact, privileged or not, and whether they go to this issue that you're talking about, receiving the education, as opposed to receiving legal advice.

MS. POLLACK: Your Honor, can I ask --

MR. WOLFSON: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. POLLACK: I'm sorry, this is Gayle Pollack.

THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Pollack.

MS. POLLACK: May I ask one further clarification and I apologize, I know you're (audio interference).

THE COURT: No, no problem.

MS. POLLACK: Mr. Francis was very clear that he will produce documents in Mr. Silva's possession. You know, I am wondering if that should be clarified to include documents, you know, nonprivileged documents in his counsel's possession that might have been provided because for example, I can easily see -- Mr. Silva having

received documents in 2016, when he filed the Silva case, not maintaining copies of those documents obviously, but his attorney would certainly have possession of the discovery from the Smucker's case.

So I just wasn't sure whether Mr. Silva -- whether Mr. Francis was trying to be very clear that he was only producing documents, you know, from Mr. Silva --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. POLLACK: -- as opposed to his law firm. Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes, and that's a good point, Ms. Pollack, which is why I clarified by saying "custody or control" because they would still be within his control, even though his counsel has them. So that's how I would be interpreting that, that those are documents that are part of Mr. Silva's file. So even though his client -- his lawyer has the documents currently, they're still -- they still can be seen as Mr. Silva's documents.

MS. POLLACK: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So that was a good point, Ms.

21 Pollack.

Mr. Francis, understood?

MR. FRANCIS: Understood.

24 THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Wolfson, I

25 don't want to rush you in a way that we don't get to

1 everything you need. Is there anything else that we haven't touched on that you need to bring up now?

MR. WOLFSON: No, Judge, and I understand you're already over the time limit and so thank you very much for your time today.

THE COURT: All right. So I have been taking notes but I think the parties have also been taking notes, so you should be clear on what should be produced and how. I think there was a request for a time frame. So why don't we say -- well, Mr. Wolfson, why don't I ask you, when do you think you'll be able to produce the requested documents and interrogatory responses, the ones that should be produced?

MR. WOLFSON: Judge, just because we're heading into the holidays, and also the unique circumstances where it's so difficult right at the moment to have clients find things because they're in and out of the office, I guess I would like to have till the first week in January.

THE COURT: Okay. January 8th?

21 MR. WOLFSON: Yes, that would be great.

22 you.

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23 THE COURT: And is that a good date for you, as

24 well, Mr. Francis?

MR. FRANCIS: That's fine, your Honor.

1 you.

THE COURT: Okay. So January 8th for both sides to produce the documents and interrogatory responses that I've compelled, and any supplements that you've promised. Okay. Thank you, everybody.

If there are other issues that need to be raised, please put them in another filing and we'll get to it. I do apologize that I didn't allot enough time to perhaps fully and in great depth, go through all of your concerns, so if there's anything confer and see if they need my attention and I will invite you to file a supplemental request if we've missed anything.

MR. WOLFSON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everybody.

MS. POLLACK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Stay safe. I'm going to turn off this recording and then we'll get back on the record for the next case.

(Matter Concluded)

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CERTIFICATE

I, LINDA FERRARA, hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of the said proceedings is a true and accurate transcript from the electronic sound-recording of the proceedings reduced to typewriting in the above-entitled matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this **5th** day of **January** 2021.

Linda Gerrara Linda Ferrara

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